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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE MARTIN ENGLISH and 
UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and .Appellants 
-vs -
DAIRYLAND MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMP ANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
11156 
The facts outlined in Appellants' Brief are substan-
tially accurate, but for clarification, we list a chrono-
logical order of events: 
June 9, 1965 
Feb. 15, 1966 
Dairyland policy issued effective to 
June 9, 1966 insuring a 1964 Sport 
Impala automobile. 
The described 1964 Sport Impala is 
traded by English for two cars, a 
1964 Monza and a 1961 Monza. 
1 
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March 16, 1966 The 30 day period expires for noti-
fyii_i~ Dairyland by English. No 
notification given Dairyland. 
April 28, 1966 The two cars, 1964 Monza and 1961 
Monza, traded for a 1966 Corvair 
Convertible. 
On the same date, United Pacific 
r. g-ent bound coverage on 1966 Cor-
vair Convertible with alleged oral 
understanding between United and 
English. No notification of trade 
of cars given to Dairyland. 
May 14, 1966 Accident resulting in injuries to 
passengers. 
May 20, 1966 Accident reported to Dairyland by 
United's agent, Mr. Ackerlind. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE FAILURE OF ENGLISH TO NOTIFY 
DAIRYLAND WITHIN THE 30-DAY PER-
IOD A VOIDED DAIRYLAND'S COVERAGE. 
Under the agreed facts, this Honorable Court is 
requested to interpret the clear and unambiguous lan-
guage of the policy, with relation to a newly acquired 
automobile, which provision is as follows: 
"Newly Acquired Automobile - an automobile, 
ownership of which is acquired by the named In-
sured or his spouse if a resident of the same 
household, if (i) it replaces an automobile owned 
2 
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by ei~er and covered by this policy, or the com-
pany msures all automobiles owned by the named 
Insured and such spouse on the date of its de-
live.~, and (ii) the named Insured or such spouse 
notifies the company within thirty days following 
such delivery date." 
The above policy provision, which is common in most 
casualty insurance policies, has universally been upheld 
and is fully enforceable. 
In 34 ALR 2d at 943, the text states: 
Sec. 7 - ACCIDENT SUBSEQUENT TO NO-
TICE PERIOD. 
"It is well established that where the auto-
matic insurance clause requires notice of the 
acquisition of a new automobile to be given the 
insurer within a specified time after delivery . . . 
a failure to give notice prior to an accident occur-
ring after the expiration of the designated period, 
precludes coverage of the new automobile." 
The footnote goes on to state: 
"It should be noted that the cases listed in 
support of this proposition all involved a failure 
to give notice prior to the accident, and are thus 
not necessarily authority on the question whether 
notice given after the specified period, but prior to 
the accident, would effect coverage of the new 
automobile." 
The reason that the provision is upheld is given, in 
part, in Mitcham vs. Travelers (CA 4th) 127 F 2d 27: 
"The requirement of notice was of obvious 
importance to the Company. Amongst other pur-
poses, it served to inform the Company of the 
3 
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ide1_1tity a~d character of the vehicle to be covered 
b_:v its pol~cy, and to enable the Company to exer-
cise th~ rights reserved to it in the policy, and to 
ascertam whether the insured had complied with 
his obligations thereunder." 
It is Appellants' contention, apparently, that no 
matter how many newly acq1J ~red cars are acquired by 
the insured, a new 30-~ay period starts to run on each 
vehicle, even though in the interim, the insured acquires 
more than one car at a time. 
Not one authority has been cited by Appellant to 
support this contention, as indicated by the following 
brief resume of the Appellants' cases in the order they 
appear in the index: 
Ashgrove Lime and Portland Cement Co. vs. Soitth-
ern Sitrety Co., (1931) 225 Mo. App. 712, 39 SW 2d 434, 
the policy in question was a fleet policy and did not even 
contain the provision under review here. 
In Birch vs. Harbor Insurance Co., (1954), 126 C.A. 
2d 714 272 P.2d 784, the described car was traded for a 
newly acquired car on November 22nd and the accident 
occurred on December 22nd, the last day of the automatic 
coverage period and the Court properly held there was 
coverage. 
In Glacier General Assurance Co. vs. State Farm 
Midual Auto Insitrance Co., (1968) --------Mont. ________ , 436 
P.2d 533, the accident occurred within the 30 day period. 
4 
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In Hoffman vs. Illinois National Casualty Co., 
(1947), 159 F.2d 564, again the accident occurred within 
the 30 day period and the Court upheld the coverage and 
went on to state: 
"Of course, in the absence of a replacement 
pro_visio~ in an automobile liability policy, the 
policy will not cover liability for an injury caused 
by an automobile other than the one described in 
the policy." 
In Johnson Red-E-Mix Construction Co. vs. United 
Pacific Insitrance Co., (1961) 11 Utah 2nd 279, 358 P.2d 
337, the question at issue was whether the insured had 
given the company notice of an accident "as soon as 
lJracticable," and that problem is not even involved in 
the case at bar. 
In Jorgensen vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 
(1962), 13 Utah 2d 303, 373 P.2d 580, the case is wholly 
immaterial to this appeal inasmuch as it dealt with a fire 
policy. 
In Kaczmark vs. LaPierrier, (1953), Mich., 60 NW 
2d 327, notice of the newly acquired car was actually 
given by the insured to the agent before the accident, 
and the agent "assured him the Pontiac was covered by 
the insured's policy," which facts, of course, are not 
present in the instant case. 
In Maryland Indemnity & Fire Insitrance Exc~ange 
vs. Steers, (1962), 21 Md. 380, 157 A. 2d 803, the insur-
ance policy did not contain a provision requiring notice of 
a newly acquired car. 
5 
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In National Indemnity Co. vs. Giampapa, (1965), 65 
Wash. 2d 627, 399 P.2d 81, the newly acquired car was 
obtained on March 11, 1961 and the accident occurred 
on March 15, 1961, and the Court properly upheld the 
automatic coverage. 
In Rasmussen vs. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 
(1964), 15 Ut. 2d 333, 393 P.2d 376, the insurance policy 
was a fleet policy which insured "any automobile" and 
the automatic coverage provision was not in the policy. 
In Stout vs. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance 
Co., (1963), 14 Utah 2d 414, 385 P.2d 608, again the 
policy is a fire policy, and the case is inapplicable. 
In Western Casualty & Surety Co. vs. Lune, (1956), 
10 Cir. Okla., 234 F 2d 916, the insured, all within 30 
days, traded a DeSoto for a Ford and the Ford for an 
Oldsmobile and was involved in an accident, and the 
Court, of course, held the policy was in force under the 
automatic coverage provision. 
In Y ahnke vs. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 
(1966), 4 Ariz. App. 287, 419 P.2d 548, a disabled Jeep 
was purchased by the Plaintiff's father one year before, 
during which time he made repairs. Less than 30 days 
before the accident, the father gave the Jeep to the 
Plaintiff (son) and the Court held "The 30 day period 
began to run when the Plaintiff became the owner of 
the Jeep" thereby upholding the 30 day provision. 
6 
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For other jurisdictions who have upheld the auto-
matic 30 day coverage provision, we refer the Honorable 
Court to the following: 
Thompson vs. Dairyland Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, (Wis.) 140 NW 2d 200. 
Employers Liability Insurance Corp. vs. Howey, 
126 F. Supp. at 345. 
Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company vs. 
Richards, 29 F 2d 210 (7th CCA). 
Summerwell vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 50 
Wash. 2d 636, 313 P 2d 1112. 
Clow vs. National Indemnity Company, 54 Wash. 
2d 198, 339 p 2d 82. 
Everly vs. Creech, 139 Cal. App. 2d 651, 294 P. 2d 
109. 
Mistele vs. Ogle, (Mo.), 293 SW 2d 330. 
Standard Accident Insurance Company vs. Co-
chardo, 152 NYS 2d 645. 
Courtney vs. Allstate, (La.) 174 So. 2d 296. 
POINT TWO 
THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES ARE 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Thompson vs. 
Dairyland Mutual Insurance Compa.ny (Supra) in up-
holding the 30 day automatic coverage provision, stated: 
"This is not a case of a claimed breach of a 
policy provision perpetrated. by the insured. 
Rather it is the failure of the rnsured to perform 
7 
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a. requir~ment of a provision of the policy, i.e. to 
give notice of a change of vehicle in order to gain 
co"."erage of a d~ff erent vehicle under the policy. 
It is not a quest10n of discontinuing coverage be-
cause of some act by the insured that breaches his 
contract; rather, it is the insured's failure to do 
some. act ~hat is re~uired to bring about coverage. 
By his failure to give proper notice, Levy was not 
insured by the subject policy at the date of the 
accident. Thus, the breach cases are not in point 
at all." 
The Appellants' contention, therefore, that prejudice 
must be shown is not borne out by law or reason. 
POINT THREE 
EVEN IF DAIRYLAND'S C 0 VER AGE 
WERE DEEMED IN FORCE, ITS COVER-
AGE WOULD BE EXCESS OVER AND 
ABOVE UNITED'S. 
As admitted in the Appellants' Brief at Page 4, the 
policy provision in question contained the following lan-
guage: 
"The insurance with respect to the newly 
acquired automobile does not apply to any loss 
against which the named insured or his spouse has 
other valid and collectible insurance." 
United wrote a liability policy describing the vehicle 
involved in the accident, for which United received a 
premium. 
United can hardly complain that their policy is pri-
mary. Certainly their agent, Ackerlind, on the date of 
the alleged oral understanding with English, had only 
8 
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to pick up the telephone and call Dairyland, if United 
were not anxious at that time to write the insurance for 
English. 
We will not belabor the point because of our cer-
tainty that, for reasons stated previously, Dairyland's 
policy afforded no coverage to English on the date of 
the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Judgment of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
702 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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